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ABOLISHING EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A RESPONSE TO JUDGE 
WOOD 
 
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss* 
 
Got along without ya before I met you 
[Can I] get along without ya now?1 
 
Chief Judge Diane Wood’s discussion of appellate authority over patent 
law brings a welcome new voice to the debate over the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisprudence.2 Her article adds considerable insight into the process of appellate 
court decision making and provides an insider’s account of the value of 
percolation in “sharpening” judicial writing, “testing” positions, and 
occasionally persuading a judge that “someone else’s perspective is preferable.”3 
In a follow-up interview, she elaborated on what she sees as a deliberative 
deficit at the Federal Circuit:  
I’ve been struck by how different [the Federal Circuit judges’] process is 
from the other courts . . . . In the circuits, we pay attention to opinions of 
other circuits and if we create conflict, we do it with our eyes open. We get 
a real exchange of ideas in a way the Federal Circuit doesn’t.4  
Judge Wood’s recommendation for changing the mechanism for 
adjudicating patent appeals is provocative. To enrich the Federal Circuit’s 
interchange with other federal appellate courts, she would bring the regional 
circuits back into the game. That is, she would give appellants in patent cases a 
choice between appealing to the Federal Circuit and appealing to the regional 
court overseeing the district where the trial was held; in cases where both sides 
  
 * Copyright © 2014 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss. I am grateful to the New York University 
students in my 2013 Patent Law course who opted to answer an exam question on the 
wisdom of Judge Wood’s proposal. Their views informed this discussion. 
 1 MILTON KELLEM, GONNA GET ALONG WITHOUT YA NOW (1952). 
 2 Hon. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s 
Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2014). 
 3 Id. at 4–6. 
 4 Lisa Shuchman, Judge Wood Proposes Changing Jurisdiction for Patent Cases, 
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appeal, or when the same patent is put into issue in multiple courts, the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) would choose the route of the appeal.5 
Admittedly, I see Judge Wood’s contribution as especially welcome 
because her views, if not her eclectic taste in music,6 are so close to my own. In 
a speech last March at Southern Methodist University Law School, I noted 
growing unrest with Federal Circuit law and cited as examples the Supreme 
Court’s accelerating interest in reviewing—and reversing—the court’s 
decisions,7 as well as critiques by organizations such as the National Academies, 
the Federal Trade Commission, and the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services’ Committee on Genetics, Health & Society.8 Like Judge Wood, I traced 
this dissatisfaction to the long-term effects of abolishing opportunities for 
percolation to the lack of robust exchange among appellate courts on novel 
questions of patent law and to the system’s inability to exploit circuit boundaries 
to experiment with solutions to the problems posed by disruptive innovations 
and novel business models.  
In my talk and in a subsequent article, I, like Judge Wood, proposed 
institutional changes designed to expand the epistemic community.9 However, 
my suggestions were very different from hers. First, I argued that recent 
developments in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), including new 
adjudicatory responsibilities under the America Invents Act (AIA),10 new 
positions for economists and policy advisors, and satellite offices located in 
important industrial centers, suggest that one way to enlarge the conversation 
  
 5 Wood, supra note 2, at 9–10 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (2006)). 
 6 See Wood, supra note 2, at 4, 6, 8 (citing the Dixie Chicks, Robin Thicke, and the 
British New Wave Band). 
 7 See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent 
Adjudication: The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505 (2013). 
 8 Office of Biological Studies, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2014); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITION (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents 
/reports/antitrust-enforcement-and-intellectual-property-rights-promoting-innovation-and 
-competition-report.s.department-justice-and-federal-trade-commission/p040101promo 
tinginnovationandcompetitionrpt0704.pdf; COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN 
GENOMIC AND PROTEIN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE 
NAT’L ACADS., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 133–44 (2006); 
COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 9 
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: 
THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1–36 (Oct. 2003). 
 9 See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 7. 
 10 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2012) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
would be to accord PTO decision-making greater deference. An obligation to 
defer may raise questions about agency capture. However, it would have the 
considerable advantage of requiring the Federal Circuit to grapple seriously with 
the views of other experts—to wit, the technologists within the PTO. In 
addition, greater deference would give the satellite offices space to experiment 
with new legal approaches to the fields practiced by neighboring industries. If 
these approaches were to remain in place long enough to determine how well 
they work, the system would have an empirical basis on which to decide 
whether they should be more widely adopted.11 
Second, I noted that the new Patent Cases Pilot Program will put district 
court judges in a position to enhance the impact of the PTO’s new role.12 As 
with the satellite offices, the judges participating in the program will likely 
develop special expertise in local technologies and gain unique perspectives on 
the problems these industries encounter. These trial courts could provide the 
Federal Circuit with an opportunity to debate not only the patentability questions 
with which the PTO deals (nonobviousness, patentable subject matter, 
disclosure, etc.), but also problems that arise at the enforcement stage (claim 
construction, contributory liability, remedies, and the like). Additionally, they 
will be in a position to watch these industries mature, to learn whether, over 
time, patenting changes in significance, and to decide whether the law should be 
modified to reflect industrial evolution. Deference to these select district courts 
would also introduce a geographic variable and thus allow experimentation with 
particular rules within each Pilot Program’s territory.13 
Finally, I looked to developments in foreign countries. Somewhat 
ironically, given the domestic unease with the Federal Circuit, other nations 
have jumped on the specialization bandwagon. Over ninety countries have 
adopted some form of specialized tribunal for patent (or intellectual property) 
cases14 and the European Union is currently in the process of establishing a 
Unified Patent Court, which would hear cases regarding the European Union’s 
proposed Unitary Patent.15 Admittedly, the laws of other countries differ from 
U.S. law, thus reducing opportunities for dialogue. However, obligations under 
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
create many commonalities and common responsibilities. In addition, the AIA’s 
switch from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file priority rule brings the US patent 
  
 11 Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 532–34. 
 12 Patent Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1, 124 Stat. 
3674, 3674–76 (2011). 
 13 Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 534–36. 
 14 ROHAZAR WATI ZUALLCOBLEY ET AL., INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., STUDY ON 
SPECIALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COURTS 2 (2012), available at http://iipi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/Study-on-Specialized-IPR-Courts.pdf. 
 15 Unified Patent Court, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary/patent-court.html. 
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regime into greater conformity with foreign law.16 Significantly, it also raises 
questions that other countries have already answered. As a result, foreign courts 
offer exciting opportunities for interchange and an experiential basis for 
choosing among approaches to open questions.17 
These proposals differ from Judge Wood’s in more than simply the 
institution chosen to generate dialogue. Judge Wood’s idea, to revive the patent 
jurisdiction of the regional circuits, reintroduces the exact sort of percolation 
envisioned by the Evarts Act18—genuine interchange among courts of equal 
stature. My proposals do not. Formal deference requirements, whether to the 
PTO or to pilot program district courts, do not create conversations among 
judges of equivalent authority; thus, they are unlikely to spark the same level of 
sharpening, testing, and persuading. Moreover, there are those who would 
question whether international exchanges could be at all fruitful.19 Nonetheless, 
my proposals do something Judge Wood’s does not: they preserve the 
exclusivity of the Federal Circuit. The question thus arises: now that the nation 
has had thirty years’ experience with exclusivity in patent adjudication, can it 
get along without it now? 
This Essay is in two parts. Part I examines the policies underlying the 
move to exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit and explains why 
none of the proponents of the court thought the absence of percolation would be 
a problem. Part II then considers Judge Wood’s proposal and shows how 
profoundly it would undermine the objectives of those who established the 
court. To be sure, in the thirty years of the court’s existence, much has changed; 
accordingly, there is now reason to question the need for exclusivity. 
Nonetheless, I conclude that this is not the time to bring the other circuits back 
into patent adjudication. In the last three years, the Federal Circuit has 
undergone rapid turnover with more expected in the near future.20 A bolus dose 
of new judges is likely to affect deliberations in the court, especially as several 
of these jurists have backgrounds (and priors) significantly different from those 
who served in the past. In my view, it is worth waiting to see if this third 
generation of judges will be the one to integrate into the judicial mainstream or 
  
 16 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: A 
New Paradigm for International Harmonisation?, 24 SINGAPORE ACAD. L.J. 669 (2013). 
 17 Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 536–39. 
 18 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
 19 Indeed, to some, citing foreign law should be an impeachable offense. See, e.g., 
Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 1, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/01/politics/01scotus.html?_ 
r=1&ei=5094&en=75b1057f5338b27c&hp=&ex=1104642000&adxnnl=1&partner=hom
epage&adxnnlx=1104588958-mdVdpUq4V7dUVBvFBzqbpg; David J. Seipp, Our Law, 
Their Law, History, and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2006). 
 20 See generally Judges, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
become receptive to other mechanisms for improving the quality of patent law, 
either through my proposals or those of other commentators.21 
I. THE DECISION TO ESTABLISH A COURT WITH EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY 
OVER PATENT LAW 
The Federal Circuit’s history is well rehearsed elsewhere.22 For these 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that of the two possible objectives for 
establishing a specialized court—improving the efficiency of adjudication or 
refining the quality of decisions—the former goal was clearly dominant in 
Congress’s thinking.23 While some consideration was given to quality, the 
overall aim was docket control. Indeed, the proceduralists of the day thought 
little of the judiciary’s role in crafting law in statutory cases. Predictable law and 
uniform national application were, of course, important because achieving these 
objectives might well reduce the number of litigated cases. But accuracy—law 
faithful to legislative intent, responsive to the needs of the patent industry, and 
  
 21 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante 
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1240–41 (2012) (suggesting 
greater dialogue among federal agencies); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking 
Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1625 (2007) (suggesting 
that one regional circuit be designated as an alternative to the Federal Circuit to hear 
appeals from trial courts and that the D.C. Circuit share responsibility with the Federal 
Circuit for appeals from the PTO); John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime 
Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 657, 720 (2009) (suggesting that the Supreme Court step on only when 
it perceives the Federal Circuit rule as “ossified.”); Cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking 
Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1445 (2012) (proposing to revamp the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to include other commercial cases or consolidating it 
into the D.C. Circuit). 
 22 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Specialized Courts]; see also 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn From the Supreme 
Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787 (2010); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The 
Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought We to Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827 
(2010); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal 
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 Berkeley TECH. L.J. 787 (2008) [hereinafter Institutional 
Identity]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in 
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 760 (2004) [hereinafter Continuing Experiment]; 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 412–14 
(1990). 
 23 I use the term “specialized” with considerable imprecision. The Federal Circuit has 
jurisdiction over a wide range of subject matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012). 
However, it is specialized in the sense that it hears almost all the appeals of patent cases 
in the nation. Moreover, these cases constitutes close to half the court’s docket (measured 
by raw numbers). See Appeals Filed, by Category FY 2013, UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, available at 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/Statistics/fy%2013%20filings%20by%20cat
egory.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
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considerate of the access interests of the public and future innovators24—was 
viewed as best left to Congress. 
A. Efficiency 
To be sure, during the run-up to the establishment of the Federal Circuit, 
there were many reasons to worry about efficient adjudication. The idea for the 
court grew out of two studies, the Freund Commission Report of 1972, which 
considered the then-burgeoning docket of the Supreme Court, and the Hurska 
Commission Report of 1974, which dealt with workload problem at the 
appellate level.25 The commission reports argued that these problems could not 
be solved by adding new judges or circuit courts New judges would create 
disuniformity within each circuit and thus generate additional appellate work; 
new circuits would lead to more circuit splits, thereby increasing pressure at the 
Supreme Court. In contrast, channeling a class of cases out of the regional 
circuits and into a separate tribunal would both relieve the workload of the other 
circuits and generate nationwide rules that would reduce the Supreme Court’s 
need to intervene. 
Patent law appeared the ideal place to start. Because the law was esoteric 
and the facts often extremely complex, lay judges complained about the 
disproportionate time spent on the cases. As Learned Hand once put it at the end 
of a case about the patentability of purified adrenaline: “I cannot stop without 
calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which makes it 
possible for a man without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to 
pass upon such questions as these. The inordinate expense of time is the least of 
the resulting evils . . . .”26  
The creative industries were unhappy as well. Because the law 
encourages innovation with the promise that costs will be recaptured ex post 
through national exploitation of successful inventions, industry regarded 
uniformity and predictability as critical. Yet there were deep divisions among 
the courts adjudicating patent cases. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(CCPA), which reviewed the PTO, along with some regional circuits, saw 
patents as essential to progress. Thus, they were inclined to issue, validate, and 
  
 24 For more on the distinction between precision and accuracy in this context, see 
Dreyfuss, Specialized Courts, supra note 22, at 5. 
 25 See REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 
(1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 573–628 (1973) (named for its Chairman, Professor 
Paul A. Freund); COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, 
THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1973), reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223, 228 (1974) (named 
for its Chair, Senator Roman Hruska). 
 26 See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D. 1911) 
(Hand, J.). 
enforce these rights.27 Other circuits followed the rather more jaundiced view 
Justice Douglas had promoted at the Supreme Court.28 Thus, they were much 
more likely to invalidate the patents presented to them.29 
Because Supreme Court intervention was sporadic, these differences 
could persist for long periods of time. Graham v. John Deere Co. furnishes an 
example.30 Congress had codified the judge-made requirement of 
nonobviousness in 1952 in an apparent attempt to reduce the high standard for 
inventiveness imposed by earlier Supreme Court cases.31 But because Justice 
Douglas had considered that high standard to be constitutionally-based,32 the 
appellate courts were confused about how to interpret the new statute. 
Nonetheless, it took fourteen years for the Supreme Court to step in. Even then it 
waffled. On the one hand, the Graham Court stated that “the general level of 
innovation necessary to sustain patentability remains the same [post 
codification].”33 On the other hand, it announced a test that could be satisfied by 
considerably less inventive advances. The result was chaos: repetitive litigation, 
forum shopping, and (arguably) a flight to trade secrecy.34 
  
 27 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (“We 
have observed a notorious difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office 
and by the courts. While many reasons can be adduced to explain the discrepancy, one 
may well be the free rein often exercised by Examiners in their use of the concept of 
‘invention.’”). 
 28 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (restricting patentable subject matter); 
Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969) (raising the 
standard of nonobviousness); Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422 (1964) (limiting 
the reach of infringement); Schultz v. Moore, 419 U.S. 930, 930 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari on the ground that patents should not be presumed 
valid); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154–55 
(1950) (Douglas, J., concurring in a judgment of obviousness on the ground that “[t]he 
invention, to justify a patent, had to serve the ends of science-to push back the frontiers of 
chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific 
knowledge.”); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612 
(1950) (Black, J., dissenting from a judgment applying the doctrine of equivalents to 
expand patent scope). 
 29 Dreyfuss, Specialized Courts, supra note 22, at 6–7. For an example of an attempt 
to switch between fora with radically different views on patents, see generally Hoffman v. 
Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). 
 30 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 31 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952). Prior to that time, the nonobviousness doctrine derived 
from Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850). 
 32 See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring), cited in 
Graham, 383 U.S. at 5). 
 33 Graham, 383 U.S. at 4–5. 
 34 See, e.g., Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments: 
Hearings on H.R. 6033, H.R. 6934, H.R. 3806, and H.R. 2414 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 574–75 (1980). 
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In this environment, it is clear why Congress would be attracted to the 
idea of a specialized patent tribunal. As Howard Markey, destined to be the first 
Chief Judge as the Federal Circuit, put it during the hearings on creating the 
court: “[I]f I am doing brain surgery every day, day in and day out, chances are 
very good that I will do your brain surgery much quicker, or a number of them, 
than someone who does brain surgery once every couple of years.”35 In later 
writing, he expanded on the advantages of a specialized court: it would produce 
a “uniform, reliable, predictable, nationally-applicable body of law.”36  
And, indeed, it has. As the patent bar’s vociferous reaction to Judge 
Wood’s proposal suggests, practitioners are largely delighted with the court.37 
Arguably, its success accounts for the significant increase in patenting that has 
occurred in the years since its founding,38 as well as for the rush of other 
countries to create their own specialized intellectual property courts. The 
Federal Circuit has, in the words of Randall Rader, Judge Markey’s successor as 
chief judge, “accomplished a great mission in bringing uniformity, 
predictability, and enforceability to [patent] law.”39 
  
 35 Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Hearing on H.R. 2405 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 42–43 (1981) [hereinafter Federal Circuit 
Hearings] (statement of the Honorable Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals); see also Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit: More than a National Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 61–62 (1984) 
(stating that creation of CAFC promoted efficiency, flexibility, and uniformity). 
 36 Hon. Howard T. Markey, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Challenge 
and Opportunity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 595, 595 (1985). 
 37 See, e.g., Ed Reines, In Defense of the Federal Circuit: A Response to Judge Wood, 
PATENT DOCS (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.patentdocs.org/2013/10/in-defense-of-the-
federal-circuit-a-response-to-judge-wood.html, and comments; Beth Z. Shaw, A Dissent 
to Chief Judge Wood’s Call to Remove Exclusive Patent Appeal Jurisdiction from 
Federal Circuit, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (Oct. 18, 2013), 
http://wlflegalpulse.com/2013/10/18/a-dissent-to-chief-judge-woods-call-to-remove-
exclusive-patent-appeal-jurisdiction-from-federal-circuit/; Comments following Debra 
Cassens Weiss, What the Dixie Chicks and Robin Thicke Know About Fixing the Patent 
System, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 8, 2013, 7:43 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/what_the_dixie_chicks_and_robin_thicke_know
_about_fixing_the_patent_system/; Tony Dutra, Donald Dunner Rejects Call for Ending 
Exclusive Federal Circuit Patent Jurisdiction, 87 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 220 
(Nov. 26, 2013). 
 38 Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 507. 
 39 Randall R. Rader, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The 
Promise and Perils of a Court of Limited Jurisdiction, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 
3 (2001). 
B. Quality 
Notice, however, what the Federal Circuit jurists did not say. Chief Judge 
Markey would do your brain surgery quicker—not better. Chief Judge Rader 
claims uniformity, predictability, and enforceability—not responsiveness to 
congressional purpose or public policy. Indeed, the history of the court is replete 
with judicial denial that law responsive to social interests is its objective. As 
Judge Alan Lourie has said, “not once have we had a discussion as to what 
direction the law should take.”40 In keeping with Judge Wood’s comment about 
differences in the Federal Circuit’s processes,41 the tribunal is also largely 
dismissive of academic scholarship42 and even Supreme Court guidance.43 The 
result is evident in the court’s decisions. They are formalistic and rigid, with a 
heavy emphasis on bright line rules.44  
Once again, nonobviousness is a good example. To bring uniformity and 
predictability to lower court decision-making, the Federal Circuit’s early 
decisions insisted that when an invention involved contributions based on 
multiple sources, the literature must include a “teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation” to combine the sources in order for the invention to be considered 
obvious in light of the references. The inflexibility of the approach led to a long 
series of cases like In re Dembiczak,45 where the Federal Circuit found an orange 
leaf bag printed with the face of a jack o’lantern patentable because the prior 
art—ordinary leaf bags, a book describing how to stuff a sandwich bag and paint 
a jack o’lantern on it—did not include a suggestion to combine. These decisions 
certainly produced predictable results in that most patents were upheld against 
obviousness challenges. However, the Supreme Court, increasingly worried 
  
 40 Alan D. Lourie, A View from the Court, 75 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 
(BNA) 22 (Nov. 2, 2007); see, e.g., Dreyfuss, Continuing Experiment, supra note 22; see 
also Paul Michel, Judicial Constellations: Guiding Principles as Navigational Aids, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 762–65 (2004); Judge Lourie Provides Tips for Patent 
Appeals to Federal Circuit, 67 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 501 (Apr. 2, 
2004) (stating that that lawyers should “[a]void emphasis on policy and legislative history 
. . . . ‘Such arguments telegraph to us that you’ll probably lose on the law.’”). 
 41 See Shuchman, supra note 4. 
 42 Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of 
Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 667, 678–83 
(2002) (finding that the regional circuits cite scholarship roughly four times as often as 
the Federal Circuit). 
 43 See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader Says KSR Didn’t Change Anything, I 
Disagree, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/10/06/chief-
judge-rader-says-ksr-didnt-change-anything-i-disagree/id=19603/. 
 44 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227–28 (2010); John R. Thomas, 
Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003). 
 45 See 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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about patent thickets,46 eventually stepped in. In KSR v. Teleflex,47 the Court 
began by “rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals,” and then went 
on to criticize the court’s rigidity five more times.48 For its part, however, the 
Federal Circuit has barely taken this reversal on board. Indeed, Chief Judge 
Rader believes the case changed nothing.49 
Thirty years into the Federal Circuit’s existence it may seem curious that 
its creators did not worry more about the quality—accuracy—of its decision-
making. In fact, at the time of the court’s founding, there were concerns about 
certain aspects of quality, including capture by the patent industries, tunnel 
vision, and the willingness of smart jurists to serve.50 Congress responded by 
broadening the court’s jurisdiction to encompass other areas of law and by 
giving it case (rather than issue) jurisdiction.51 
Interestingly, however, percolation was not considered an important 
component of the judicial process. To the contrary, in the statutory context, the 
leading proceduralists of the day saw percolation as a negative: 
As applied to judicial interpretations of federal statutes, “percolation” is a 
euphemism for incoherence. The argument has the earmark of being an 
effort to put a good face on a bad situation. Whatever modest value there 
may be in these regional discrepancies as to federal statutory provisions, 
the benefit is outweighed by the cost to the system and to American 
citizens. . . . The percolation that produces intercircuit inconsistencies and 
  
 46 Cf. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari in a case about patentable subject 
matter) (“sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts’”). 
 47 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 48 Id. at 415, 419 (twice), 421, 422, 428. 
 49 See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 43. For an example, see C.W. Zumbiel Co., Inc. v. 
Kappos, 702 F.3d 1371, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Prost, J., dissenting). This is not, 
however, to say that Judge Rader is correct in his assessment of outcomes. See Jason 
Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 
16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709 (2012) (showing differences between pre- and post-KSR 
decisions). However there are other examples of the court’s intransigence. See, for 
example, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002), 
where the Supreme Court granted certiorari because it did not think the Federal Circuit 
had followed its mandate in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 
17, 39 n.8 (1997) to implement the Court’s approach to the doctrine of equivalents. See 
also Medtronic Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014), which the Court 
took to prevent the Federal Circuit from eviscerating the decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007), to facilitate challenges to patent licenses. 
MedImmmune was heard for similar reasons: otherwise, the Federal Circuit would have 
eviscerated the decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
 50 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 335 (2003). 
 51 See Dreyfuss, supra note 7. 
incoherence may provide intellectual stimulation for academicians, but in 
the world of human activity it works costly inequities.52 
To these thinkers, settling statutory questions was more important than 
getting them right.53 Presumably, getting questions decided correctly was the 
province of the legislature. As long as the law was uniform and predictable, 
Congress could always correct mistakes by amending the legislation to clarify 
its import. 
The Federal Circuit experience suggests, however, the proceduralists’ 
assumption of legislative oversight is flawed. In part, the problem may be patent 
law. Although invention is by its very nature disruptive, patent policy may not 
have the political salience that draws immediate legislative attention to the 
problems of adapting old law to new technology and business practices. 
Furthermore, while there may have been a time when the patent industries were 
united enough to agree on legislation and move its passage, there are now deep 
divisions among various sectors.54 Industries such as the pharmaceutical industry 
that use discrete patents to protect individual and easily reverse-engineered 
products, do not see the problems experienced by the electronics and 
information technology industries, where products often involve multiple 
patents, some with claims of unclear scope. Both are differently positioned from 
biotechnology, where many inventions are in Pasteur’s Quadrant and have both 
upstream (research) use and downstream applications, which confound 
prescriptive approaches to infringement. 
  
 52 Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional 
Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 634 (1989); see also HENRY 
J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 161–62 (Columbia Univ. Press 
1973), cited in Paul D. Carrington & Paulina Orchard, The Federal Circuit: A Model for 
Reform?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 575, 583 (2010) (noting that the lack of sub-Supreme 
Court capacity for “authoritative determination” of statutory issues was the most 
significant question facing the judicial system); Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the 
Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 690 (1990) (“percolation is not a purposeful 
project. It is just a way of postponing decision”); Erwin M. Griswold, The Federal Courts 
Today and Tomorrow: A Summary and Survey, 38 S.C. L. REV. 393, 409 (1987) (“‘the 
law’ has become a gossamer web with very little in it on which a lawyer or judge can 
firmly and safely rely”). 
 53 Carrington & Orchard, supra note 52, at 583. 
 54 Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The United States Patent Reform Quagmire: A Balanced 
Proposal, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 709, 711 (2005); Jay P. Kesan & Thomas S. Ulen, 
Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 58 (2001) 
(attempts at patent reform can be compared with the description of industry cooperation 
over copyright reform); see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative 
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987); see, e.g., WILLIAM KINGSTON, BEYOND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MATCHING INFORMATION PROTECTION TO INNOVATION 87 
(2010) (citing Judge Rich as explaining that “The [1952] Patent Act was written basically 
by patent lawyers . . . . A good 95% of the members [of Congress] never knew that the 
legislation was under consideration, or that it had passed, let alone what it contained”). 
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The problem, however, likely goes well beyond patent law. In the 
statutory context, it can be difficult to fix individual mistakes legislatively, for 
the fix can distort other provisions in the statute. Furthermore, it may be 
misconstrued by the courts Consider, for example, business method patents. 
Patents on business techniques were almost unknown until the Federal Circuit 
decided State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., which held that 
any advance that produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result is patentable.55 
The absence of a literature on business methods in the PTO (or, in fact, 
anywhere else) meant that many business techniques that had long been 
practiced suddenly became subject to patent rights. The resulting possibilities 
for infringement produced its own little havoc. As Forbes magazine put it in 
connection with Priceline’s patent for matching travelers to hotel rooms:  
Cool! Jay Walker has apparently patented the ‘business method’ known as 
a Dutch auction – a method by which the U.S. Treasury sells hundreds of 
billions of dollars’ worth of securities each year.56 
The problem quickly came to Congress’s attention. But rather than do the hard 
work of drawing up legislation to target the sorts of advances that should not be 
protectable, Congress fixed the problem with a band-aid. It grafted onto the 
statute a provision to exempt prior users of business methods from infringement 
liability.57 The provision was not the subject of significant litigation. However, 
when the Supreme Court tried, in Bilski v. Kappos, to clean up the mess that 
business method patents produced, the provision stood in its way. Rather than 
see it as expressing legislative skepticism about the need for these patents, 
Justice Scalia interpreted it as congressional approval of business method 
patenting.58 The fractured decision in Bilski later required the Supreme Court to 
hear another business method case to clarify when these advances are 
patentable.59 
Centralizing adjudication has two other problems. First, while a national 
rule may be better at drawing the legislature’s attention to a problem, it deprives 
lawmakers of experience with alternative approaches. For example, had more 
  
 55 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 56 Readers Say, FORBES (May 31, 1999), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1999/0531/6311018a.html. (statement by Byron L. Winn). 
 57 35 U.S.C. § 273(b) (2006). 
 58 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (“A conclusion that business 
methods are not patentable in any circumstances would render § 273 meaningless. This 
would violate the canon against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that 
would render another provision superfluous.”); see also OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just 
Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1401–02 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (interpreting the meaning of a 
legislative amendment designed to improve internal communication within firms in a 
way that inhibits the free flow of information outside firms).  
 59 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 
S. Ct. 734 (Mem) (2013) (No. 13-298). 
than one court confronted claims to business methods, the legislature could have 
compared experience in jurisdictions that recognized these patents with results 
in places that did not.60 Second, centralization can change the court’s perception 
of its relationship to Congress. The reaction to patent assertion entities (so-called 
patent trolls) is telling. As noted earlier, Federal Circuit adjudication is highly 
formalistic. But some judges have not been content with blind fidelity to the 
plain meaning of statutory language. When Congress tried to deal with the 
problems posed by opportunistic litigation—a problem the Federal Circuit 
arguably created through its liberal attitude towards injunctive and monetary 
relief61—then-Chief Judge Michel took the somewhat unusual step of personally 
going up to Capitol Hill and (successfully) persuaded Congress to retain the 
remedies provisions of the 1952 Act.62 
II. PERCOLATION VS. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION 
Experience with the Federal Circuit is, in short, a lesson on the 
relationship between statutes and judge-made law. The legislature is not as well 
positioned to oversee the implementation of legislation as the proceduralists of 
the late twentieth century assumed; high quality judicial decisions appear to be 
necessary to a well-functioning statutory system and dissatisfaction with the 
Federal Circuit’s output suggests that percolation is a key to quality. As Judge 
Wood argues, percolation encourages more persuasive writing—which arguably 
requires harder thinking about the contents of decisions. It also provides input to 
sister circuits and signals to the Supreme Court when to step in to hear a case. 
The availability of multiple courts creates a way for litigants to revisit an issue 
without offending the judges who decided it in the first place. John Duffy and 
Craig Nard note another advantage: an early decision in one court can spur the 
lawyers in subsequent cases to find better arguments.63 Finally, as I argued in my 
article on percolation, multiple adjudications can wash out the framing and 
  
 60 Cf. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Co., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1366 (2013) (comparing 
experience on the circuits that recognized international exhaustion and those that did not); 
id. at 1389 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting and making a similar comparison). 
 61 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2141 (2013). 
 62 See Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing on S. 1145 Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 278 (2007) (submission for the record of 
Paul Michel, C.J.), available at 
http://www.patentreform.info/Emails%20from%20JM/Senate%20hearing%20June%206,
%202007.pdf; Letter from Paul Michel to Chairman Leahy and Ranking Member Specter 
(June 13, 2007), available at http://www.intellectualpropertylawblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/98/2007/06/Michel-letter-to-Senators-6-13-071.pdf. 
 63 Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1633 (2007). 
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anchoring effects that can make for bad law and it can provide opportunities to 
see how different approaches work in practice.64 
Hence Judge Wood’s suggestion that appellants be given a choice 
between the regional circuit overseeing the district court where the case was 
decided and the Federal Circuit. She paints an especially attractive picture with 
her example of the software industry. Noting the problems this sector is 
encountering and Dan Burk and Mark Lemley’s comments on how badly the 
law is currently tailored to that industry, she argues that the Ninth Circuit, where 
a disproportionate share of software cases arise, would be extremely well 
positioned to find law responsive to those innovating in this space.65 In fact, the 
Ninth Circuit may be better positioned than the Federal Circuit, for while there 
are judges on the Federal Circuit with prior experience in various technical 
fields, no one on the current bench has a background in computer science. Once 
the Ninth Circuit speaks, its opinion (or subsequent experience) can influence 
other courts grappling with software questions. At some point, courts will 
converge on that solution or the Supreme Court will create a nationwide rule. 
Further, if successful, the approach might be expanded to other sectors with 
similar characteristics. Judge Wood also suggests that she would welcome 
reintegration of patent cases into her circuit. Because of the Seventh Circuit’s 
preeminence in antitrust law, its participation could make an important 
contribution in restoring the balance between exclusive rights and competition.66 
A. Assessing Judge Wood’s Position 
The question Judge Wood’s proposal raises is whether the quality benefits 
of the sort of percolation envisioned by the Evarts Act outweigh the potential 
losses in efficiency, which, as we saw, was Congress’s prime objective in 
establishing the Federal Circuit. Surely, there will be losses. Convergence will 
not be automatic and in the meantime, circuit splits and forum shopping are 
  
 64 Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 524–26 (discussing Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make 
Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884–85 (2006)). For an example of experience-based 
decision-making, see Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1366–67, 1389–90 (2013), which considers 
the question whether copyright law recognizes an international exhaustion doctrine by 
looking at the experience of circuits that had adopted opposing approaches. See also id. at 
1366–67; id. at 1389–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 65 Wood, supra note 2, at 10 (citing Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in 
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577–78 (2003)). 
 66 See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 33–34 (2006) 
(heavily criticizing the Federal Circuit’s approach); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 
2230–37 (2013) (coming to a different conclusion on reverse-payments from the one 
announced by the Federal Circuit in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 
544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
inevitable.67 These splits are likely to be more disruptive than they are in other 
kinds of cases. In ordinary circuit splits, the parties know where they do 
business and thus have some basis on which to predict what law will govern 
their behavior. Even if the prediction is wrong, they will know the applicable 
law as soon as a suit commences. In Judge Wood’s system, the parties learn the 
applicable law only after one of them loses and chooses where to appeal. 
Not only will this make planning primary conduct problematic, it will 
make litigation extremely difficult. If, for example, the Federal and regional 
circuits were to take different views on claim construction (a hotly contested 
area68), it will be impossible for the district judge to know, at the time of the 
trial, what evidence on infringement will be considered relevant to the court of 
appeals.69 Worse, the incentives at trial could become very peculiar indeed. If 
the patentee (or patent troll) knows the Federal Circuit is likely to look at its 
case more favorably than courts more closely attuned to social policy, it may 
prefer to try the case halfheartedly, with the idea that it would be better to lose at 
trial and obtain the right to choose the appellate court than to win at trial and 
lose on appeal in a court chosen by its adversary. 
Finally, Judge Wood’s proposal does not account for appeals from the 
PTO. These will significantly increase under the AIA because the statute 
includes several new procedures for challenging issued patents 
administratively.70 Presumably, appeals from these adjudications will continue 
to be heard by the Federal Circuit. But, as we saw, Congress was motivated to 
create the Federal Circuit in part because of the “notorious differences” between 
the law laid down by the CCPA and the regional circuits. If the Federal Circuit 
  
 67 Significantly, forum shopping for a favorable district court persists despite the 
existence of the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1444, 1462–68 (2010). 
 68 See generally R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? 
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Doctrine, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed. 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1909028 (analyzing all 
observable Federal Circuit claim construction opinions between 1996 and 2007); David 
L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008) (analyzing Federal Circuit 
reversal rates of U.S. district court judges on claim construction issues); Mark A. Lemley, 
The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2005) 
(examining two different doctrines of claim construction); cf. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted. 82 U.S.L.W. 3469 (Mar. 31, 
2014) (No. 13-854) (raising the question of the degree of deference to be accorded to 
district court claim constructions). 
 69 See, e.g., CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (refusing to grant a new trial after the Federal Circuit disagreed with the trial court 
on claim construction). Presumably, the appellate route problem is the reason the Federal 
Circuit defers to the regional circuits on procedural rules that do not implicate patent law 
questions. See, e.g., Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp., 550 F.3d 1112, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 70 35 U.S.C. §§ 257(a), 311, 321 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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and regional circuits fail to converge on particular positions, then this 
differential will also recur. As with the trial judges, the PTO would have no way 
to predict what court will hear the appeal of an enforcement action and 
ultimately consider whether a patent it has issued is valid. 
It is also unclear whether the benefits will be as great as Judge Wood 
envisions. Foremost is the possibility of selection effects. While patentees will 
probably prefer appeals to the Federal Circuit, alleged infringers with defenses 
sounding in public policy will likely choose a regional circuit. That will leave 
the Federal Circuit hearing even fewer cases involving weighty social interests 
and could make the court even less receptive to taking countervailing 
considerations into account. 
In addition, the Federal Circuit may be as reluctant to follow a regional 
court’s view as it is to follow Supreme Court decisions. To be sure, the circuit is 
in a curious position vis-à-vis the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court tends to 
grant certiorari when the Federal Circuit hears cases en banc and issues multiple 
opinions. In that situation, reluctance to conform to Supreme Court mandates is 
not surprising as almost every judge will have staked out a position in writing. It 
will be much easier to converge with, say, the Ninth Circuit on an issue that the 
Federal Circuit judges have not already exhaustively argued. At the same time 
however, the court also has a very firm belief in its own expertise. As former 
Chief Judge Michel once said, “There’s . . . a certain amount of suspicion that 
there might be some deeper immersion, deeper familiarity, harder thinking and 
greater exposure [to patent law] at the Federal Circuit than the Supreme Court 
itself can offer.”71 Whether the court would be willing to believe that other 
circuits have more expertise in issues touching on patent law is an open 
question.  
Most significantly, the Wood proposal does not truly duplicate the kind of 
percolation created by the Evarts Act. Because the route of appeal is 
indeterminate, it does not allow for experimentation across either technological 
or geographic variables. While Judge Wood is surely right that enlarging the 
epistemic community would enhance quality, in an empirical age, evidence-
based decision-making is increasingly valued.72 Sacrificing uniformity without 
creating “laboratories of experimentation” seems like a lost opportunity. 
Clearly, Judge Wood believes that the gains in quality are worth any 
concomitant loss in efficiency. She presents three arguments. First, she does not 
believe the loss in efficiency is likely to be significant. She notes that there are 
  
 71 Roy Zwahlen, Mayo v. Prometheus: Thought Leaders Express Concern and 
Evaluate the Impact, BIOTECHNOW (May 21, 2012), http://www.biotech-
now.org/public-policy/patently-biotech/2012/05/mayo-v-prometheus-thought-leaders-
express-concern-evaluate-business-impact-and-discuss-the-future.  
 72 See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294774. 
some patent issues that even now are resolved outside the Federal Circuit. She 
points to cases like the recent Gunn v. Minton,73 which use the well-pleaded 
complaint rule to direct cases raising patent issues tangentially or in the 
defense’s case, to other tribunals. She notes that these adjudications do not 
significantly affect uniformity. Second, she would avoid inconsistent 
interpretations of the same patent by relying on the JPML to select a single 
forum to hear all the cases involving the same invention.74 Third, she argues that 
the “Federal Circuit would still play a leading role in shaping patent law.” Here, 
she relies on the adjudication of administrative law cases, where the regional 
circuits tend to adhere to the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence.75  
These arguments are not persuasive. Gunn is a patent malpractice case. 
While the case raises a question on the applicability of the experimental use 
exception to the on-sale bar of the 1952 Patent Act,76 the answer is to be 
supplied by a state court in the context of determining whether failure to raise 
the exception caused the patentee to lose its case. Whatever the decision, it will 
not create disuniformity because no one will be bound by the holding on the 
patent law issue. There are so few such cases in any one state, the decision is 
also not likely to affect very many litigants through stare decisis. In contrast, the 
cases Judge Wood envisions the regional circuits deciding will bind the patentee 
and its licensees,77 and create federal precedent that will affect future cases, at 
least in the same circuit. During the Federal Circuit’s early years, patent issues 
appearing in compulsory counterclaims were heard in the regional circuits, 
where they had a similar effect. It is not insignificant that the AIA changed that 
approach to promote uniformity.78  
Judge Wood’s idea for having the JPML consolidate cases involving the 
same patent in the same appellate court is also problematic. Apparently, she 
assumes that challenges to the same patent occur simultaneously (as with some 
mass torts). But that is not necessarily so: as long as the patentee wins the first 
case, it will live to enforce the same patent in subsequent proceedings for the 
  
 73 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1066–68 (2012). 
 74 Wood, supra note 2, at 9. 
 75 Id. at 10. 
 76 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 102(b), 66 Stat. 792, 797 (current version at 35 
U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(1) (current through P.L. 113-92 (excluding P.L 113-76, 113-79, and 
113-89)). 
 77 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. Ill. Found’n, 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). 
 78 See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830–
354 (2002) (leaving compulsory counterclaims to appeal in the regional circuits). The 
AIA changed the procedure, providing that: 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the Unit-
ed States . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a 
party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Con-
gress relating to patents or plant variety protection.  
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 
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duration of the life of the patent.79 Presumably, the JPML could channel later 
cases to whatever court heard the first one. However, that possibility only 
intensifies the incentives problem at trial. Even the patentee who is confident in 
the first case of a win on any circuit, may worry about the arguments that later 
litigants might assert. If so, the patentee will prefer to find a way to acquire the 
right to choose the route of appeal in the first case so that it can subject later 
litigants to the same court. To be sure, all choices made by the JPML are 
somewhat coercive, but in the usual case, the choice is not preordained by an 
adversary’s strategic manipulation in earlier litigation. 
It is harder to evaluate Judge Wood’s third argument on the Federal 
Circuit’s leading role in patent jurisprudence. At the same hearing at which 
Judge Markey testified about brain surgery, it was opined that patent cases were 
“the most unattractive thing about being a Federal judge.”80 A court unhappy to 
be stuck with such a case might well convince itself that the best course would 
be to defer to the Federal Circuit’s alleged expertise.81 A decision to defer would 
certainly make for greater uniformity, and eliminate forum shopping and skewed 
incentives at trial. But it would not create a dialogue. To improve quality, the 
regional circuits would have to refrain from following Federal Circuit precedent 
in cases of national importance. Or, at least, the Federal Circuit would have to 
be worried enough about the possibility to write more persuasively. However, 
the fear of being overruled by the Supreme Court has not led to more thoughtful 
output.82 Perhaps the fear of disuniformity would be a better motivator than the 
fear of Supreme Court reversal (which the Federal Circuit has shown itself to be 
adept at ignoring). But to make the threat credible, the regional courts will have 
to do some branching out on their own, and that will reintroduce the 
inefficiencies that plagued the system in the 1980s.  
B. A Changing Landscape 
Arguably, however, the system can better tolerate these inefficiencies 
now. The docket problems that were the object of the Freund and Hruska 
Commissions’ studies appear to have abated. There is considerable controversy 
  
 79 See, e.g., CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1162 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (noting that the same patent had been the subject of litigation a year earlier); 
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (noting that two litigations 
over the same patent had occurred nine years apart).  
 80 Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 35, at 46 (statement of Rep. Sawyer). 
 81 Cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 
405 (2012). 
 82 See generally Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme 
Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271 (2013). 
as to the current workload of the courts of appeals,83 but the backlog in judicial 
appointments makes it difficult to accurately assess whether there are enough 
judgeships to meet the nation’s needs. Obviously, however, Chief Judge Wood 
believes that her circuit could absorb some patent cases without undue hardship. 
At the Supreme Court, the situation is clearer: the docket is significantly smaller 
than it was in the 1980’s.84 Furthermore, the Court has been hearing several 
patent cases each Term for more than a decade.85 Disagreement among the 
regional circuits and the Federal Circuit could therefore be resolved more 
quickly today than in the Graham era. In fact, these splits would probably be 
better at directing the Court’s attention to important national issues than the 
current practice of relying on dissents and en bancs in the Federal Circuit.86 As 
Dembiczak illustrated, the judges of the Federal Circuit can be in agreement on a 
rule that is less than ideal from a social perspective. 
As to the benefits, it is also possible that past experience with the Federal 
Circuit is not helpful in predicting how amenable the Federal Circuit would be 
to percolation in the future. Several new judges have joined the court, and these 
jurists have backgrounds significantly more varied than those of the earlier 
judges.87 That is, the first generation of judges came from the CCPA and the 
United States Court of Claims.88 Both tribunals had limited jurisdiction and 
rarely (or in the case of the CCPA, never) entertained infringement actions. 
Accordingly, no one on the court had enjoyed the opportunity to focus 
systematically on the impact of patenting on creative production. Several judges 
in the second generation were drawn from legislative circles. They joined Judge 
Rich, one of the drafters of the 1952 Patent Act.89 Arguably, these jurists had a 
predilection for adhering closely to the legislative language their former 
employers (or they themselves) had drafted. As I have earlier argued, the judges 
in both these groups may have also seen formalism as a way to establish 
  
 83 See generally Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking A Devil’s Bargain: The Federal 
Courts and Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 473 (2009); Chad M. Oldfather, Limitations (A Response to Judge Posner), 51 DUQ. 
L. REV. 67 (2013). 
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legitimacy—or at least as a way to refrain from ruffling the feathers of important 
interest groups.90  
The newest generation is different. Kathleen O’Malley is the first Federal 
Circuit judge to have previously served on a federal district court, Evan Wallach 
was elevated from the Court of International Trade, and Raymond Chen was 
formerly Solicitor at the PTO.91 Not only have these three experienced first-hand 
the costs of the court’s rigidity, they have joined the court almost 
simultaneously. Indeed, since 2010, six of the twelve seats on the Federal 
Circuit have changed hands.92 While one new judge may have a difficult time 
altering the karma of a courthouse, a 50% turnover creates a cohort better able to 
withstand pressure to pursue “business as usual.” Thus, as with immigrant 
families,93 the third generation may integrate more fully into the larger judicial 
culture. It may be more willing to adopt processes similar to those of the other 
circuits, more receptive to policy arguments, and more disposed to engage in 
dialogue with other courts and with scholars, federal agencies, and other 
institutions.94 
At the same time, however, the changing landscape can cut two ways. On 
the one hand, new developments suggest that Judge Wood’s proposal would 
work better than past experience predicts—it would be less costly because the 
Supreme Court could end splits quickly and it would be more productive of 
discourse because the new judges may be receptive to arguments that prior 
generations dismissed. On the other hand, these changes also make it less 
necessary to implement the Wood proposal. The new judges may shake up the 
status quo without introducing disuniformity. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s 
greater availability enlarges opportunities for dialogue. Patentable subject matter 
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 91 See generally Judges, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges (last visited March 14, 2014). 
 92 Don W. Martens, Filling the Vacancies on the Federal Circuit, LANDSLIDE, Mar.-
Apr. 2010, at 1, 1 (noting that by the end of 2010, only four judges would not be eligible 
for retirement or senior status, leaving the possibility of nine vacancies by the end of 
President Obama’s first term). In addition to Judges Wallach, O’Malley, and Chen, the 
new judges are Jimmie Reyna, Richard Taranto, and Todd Hughes. 
 93 See generally Grace Kao & Marta Tienda, Optimism and Achievement: The 
Educational Performance of Immigrant Youth, 76 SOC. SCI. Q. 1 (1976), available at 
http://globalnetwork.princeton.edu/piirs/Kao%20and%20Tienda.pdf. 
 94 See, e.g., id.; Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 22, at 823–26; see also 
Dennis Crouch, Dissenting Opinions at the Federal Circuit, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 2, 2012), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/dissenting-opinions-at-the-federal-circuit.html 
(showing a high dissent rate for Judges O’Malley and Reyna, appointed in 2010 and 
2011, respectively); cf. James D. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues: Veterans 
Law at the Federal Circuit in 2012, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1037, 1098 (2013) (noting that the 
turnover in judges has prompted new thinking in the Federal Circuit’s veterans law 
jurisprudence). 
is a good example: after Justice Breyer announced his doubts about expanding 
the ambit of patent law in Lab Corp. v. Metabolite,95 the Supreme Court heard 
three subject matter cases and granted certiorari in a fourth.96 One of these cases 
went up and down twice, and thus created considerable interchange with the 
Federal Circuit.97  
By the same token, as the dependence of the economy on knowledge 
production has become evident, Congress has become much more attentive to 
patent policy. The AIA made many significant changes in the statute in 2011 
and other modifications are under consideration.98 Thus, the assumption of the 
early proceduralists may, in the end, turn out to be closer to the truth. Even if 
not, patent law is certainly receiving greater attention elsewhere. In the last few 
years, the Solicitor General’s office, the National Institutes of Health, the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National 
Economic Council, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, and the 
Federal Trade Commission have expanded the community debating patent 
policy.99 Increasing numbers of amicus briefs also supply the court with valuable 
information about broader social interests.100 
In evaluating the Wood proposal, it is also worth noting that in the last 
thirty years, significant changes have occurred that raise the costs of 
disuniformity. Whereas in earlier times, the need for uniformity arose 
principally because of the interstate nature of patent exploitation, there has been 
a revolution in the conduct of research, development, and manufacturing. 
Invention is less a matter of relying on in-house staff scientists, and more of a 
collaborative enterprise, involving geographically dispersed participants in ever-
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changing affiliations.101 Some industries have adopted a value-chain 
development and manufacturing strategy, which can similarly involve actors in 
many different locations.102 Furthermore, the Internet has facilitated peer 
production, with participants drawn from all over the nation (or the world).103 In 
all of these cases, predictable law is key. Without knowing what law will apply 
to their behavior, it is impossible for participants in these arenas to determine 
rights or freedom to operate. And because venue rules have changed since the 
Federal Circuit was created, these actors are much more vulnerable to aggressive 
forum shopping.104 Taking these costs and the uncertain benefits of Judge 
Wood’s proposal into account, the best course may be to wait, at least a few 
years, to see how the new bench performs before destroying the exclusivity 
Congress worked so hard to create. 
CONCLUSION 
Chief Judge Wood has performed a valuable service in reviving the 
debate over the wisdom of channeling all patent appeals to the Federal Circuit. 
She paints an appealing picture of the benefits of reintroducing circuit dialogue 
into the adjudicatory process. Changes in the composition of the Federal Circuit 
and in the attentiveness of Congress and the Supreme Court to patent problems 
make her proposal especially viable. However, these factors may also render her 
proposal unnecessary. More important, the AIA raises many new questions. But 
because the Wood proposal makes neither technological or territorially 
distinctions, experimenting with different solutions to these problems would not 
be possible. Better, then, would be to see whether the newly-composed Federal 
Circuit and greater national focus on innovation changes the dynamics of 
deliberation internally or in relation to the Supreme Court or to other entities 
engaged in thinking about innovation. A reconstituted PTO, the district court 
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pilot program, and the newly-created foreign analogues to the Federal Circuit 
will also enlarge the epistemic community and create opportunities for natural 
experiments without significantly sacrificing predictability. Admittedly, these 
experiments will affect uniformity, but they do so in ways with which the 
parties—who know which districts and technologies they work with—can cope. 
Perhaps these developments will not make a difference: at that point, it will be 
worthwhile to reconsider Chief Judge Wood’s proposal. But while we got along 
without exclusivity before we met the Federal Circuit, it would be a pity to get 
along with it just yet. 
